






Bank Imputed Interest Rates: 
Unbiased Estimates of Offered Rates? 
 





















































Finance & Economics Department 
HEC School of Management 








Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
230 South LaSalle Street 











We examine whether “imputed” interest rates obtained from bank financial statements are unbiased 
estimates of “offered” interest rates that the same banks report in surveys.  We find evidence of a 
statistically significant amount of bias.  However, the statistical bias that we document does not appear to 
be economically significant. When used as dependent variables in regression analysis, imputed rates and 
offered rates lead to the same policy conclusions.  Our work has important methodological implications 
for empirical research that examines the product market competition among depository institutions.  
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  Analysis of product market competition in the banking and finance literature (and more generally, 
in the industrial organization literature) has critical public policy implications.   It aids antitrust analysis, 
for example, in determining whether proposed bank mergers will adversely affect consumers through 
increased market concentration.  The theory models on which this analysis is based refer to prices that the 
banking firm offers to its customers given the structure of the market it faces.  Likewise, the empirical 
literature examines the statistical relationship between the banking product prices and market 
concentration.  This line of research uses deposit and loan interest rates as dependent or explanatory 
variables.  Those prices are, however, a topic of contention.  Prices are difficult to measure and in the 
banking research, as is the case in most fields of economic research, transaction prices are difficult to 
obtain.  The alternative is to impute prices, that is, to calculate prices by taking the ratio of interest 
expenses (revenue) to the stock of deposits (loans).  However, imputed prices, which incorporate 
measurement error, may incorporate bias that affects the results of empirical analyses. 
In this paper, we examine whether “imputed” (calculated) interest rates are suitable estimates of 
“offered” (transaction) interest rates using a set of U.S. banks for which both rates are observable.  What 
we term as “offered” rates are those explicitly stated by banks in surveys, and we assume that the offered 
rates are indeed the “true” interest rates to which the theory models refer.
1  Many researchers, however, 
rely on interest rates that are imputed from the financial statements because offered rates are either only 
observable for a limited sample of banks or simply not observable.  Even when observed, offered rates 
may not be readily accessible because they are collected through surveys that are either confidential or 
sold by private data providers.
2  This contrasts with imputed interest rates which are calculated using 
                                                 
1 We discuss whether such an assumption is warranted later in the paper.   
2 In the U.S., interest rate survey data collected by the Federal Reserve System, such as the Monthly Survey of 
Selected Deposits or the Survey of the Terms of Lending, remain confidential.  Access is limited to economists 
working for one of the federal banking regulators.  Data from private data providers, such as the Bank Rate 
Monitor, are available at a non-trivial cost.   2
information provided in the financial statements.  While financial statements, and as a result, imputed 
interest rates, are available at no cost for the population of U.S. banks, these constructed variables may 
involve significant measurement error that could lead to systematic bias.  Whether such bias exists and, if 
it exists, whether it affects empirical model estimates are questions that have not been systematically 
explored.
3  In this paper, our goal is to determine whether using imputed rather than offered interest rates 
leads to any statistically and economically significant bias.  We focus on deposit accounts, rather than 
loans, because the former have more standard product characteristics than the latter.
4   
Our work has important methodological implications for large strands of empirical research on 
depository financial institutions.  Our results provide evidence of statistically significant bias: the raw 
imputed deposit rates are not particularly good estimates of the stated interest rates that banks offer to 
their customers.  However, the observed bias decreases when imputed rates are winsorized or truncated, 
with the truncation being more effective than the winsorization.  Once the imputed rate data have been 
truncated, they become more suitable estimates of the offered rates.  Moreover, the observed statistical 
bias is not economically significant.  We show that the coefficient estimates obtained when either imputed 
or offered rates are used as dependent variables have the same sign, same order of magnitude and the 
same order of statistical significance.  The important implication of our work is that, when properly 
adjusted for measurement error, imputed interest rates lead to the same policy conclusions as offered 
rates.  The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the data, section 3 provides a short survey of the 




                                                 
3 Hannan and Prager (1999) touch on this in their work.  We discuss their paper below.   
4 Loans are significantly more heterogeneous intermediation products than deposits.  This holds true even for more 
standardized lending contracts, such as mortgages.  Although it is possible to observe and control for some of the 
price and non-price loan characteristics in the loan survey data that are available (such as the Survey of the Terms 
of Lending), it is not possible to create imputed rates for homogeneous loan categories using Call Reports due to 
lack of detail at the product level.  Moreover, loans’ differing maturities make it difficult to compare imputed loan 
rates with lending rates offered to customers.   3
2. Data on Offered Rates and Imputed Rates 
  We combine data from three different sources.  Imputed deposit interest rates are calculated using 
data from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (the Call Reports), the publicly available 
quarterly financial statements that all U.S. commercial banks file with their federal regulators.  We impute 
rates for three types of deposit accounts for which information is available in the Call Reports: Negotiable 
Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts, Money Market Deposit Accounts (MMDA), and passbook 
savings accounts.  NOW accounts, first introduced in 1980, are interest paying withdrawal-upon-demand 
checking accounts with minimum balance requirements.  MMDA accounts, first introduced in 1982 by 
banks to compete with the Money Market Mutual Funds, pay higher interest rates than NOW accounts but 
have more restrictive check-writing privileges and higher minimum balance requirements than NOW 
accounts.
5  Passbook savings accounts are traditional household saving instruments without check-writing 
privileges.
6     
The imputed rates are calculated for each of the three account types by dividing the quarterly 
interest expense in the Call Reports by the stock of deposits for that quarter.  It should be noted that the 
Call Report deposit expense items do not include any other fees or expenses related to deposit account 
management.
7  We use two measures of quarterly imputed rates.  The first of these is based on the latest 
stock of deposits of the corresponding account type at the current quarter’s end, and the second is based 
on the average of deposits over the quarter.
8  The survey offered rates are stated as simple (non-
                                                 
5 Prior to the introduction of NOW and MMDA accounts, checking accounts did not pay explicit interest in the U.S.  
By 1984, the start of our sample period, both types of accounts were among the standard banking products. 
6 We exclude certificates of deposits (CDs) and negotiable certificates of deposits (NCDs), which are non-checkable 
savings accounts with specific maturities, from our analysis.  Although interest rates on these instruments are 
included in the MSSD survey, there are no corresponding interest expense items in the Call Reports that are 
detailed enough to impute maturity-specific CD rates.   
7 Our focus, similar to most of the empirical banking literature, is on explicit interest rates.  Implicit rates paid on 
deposits (in the form of service flows, such as the number checks or transfers allowed per month) and fees that 
depositors are charged are excluded from our analysis.  Note that, since we match imputed rates that we calculate 
for a particular bank with the offered rates by the same institution, differences in implicit interests or fees charged 
across banks do not affect our analysis.   
8 The stock of deposits is stated in Schedule RC-E of the Call Reports and the quarterly average is reported in 
Schedule RC-K of the Call Reports.   4
compounded) annual percentage rates.  To make the quarterly imputed rates comparable with the annual 
offered rates, we multiply the quarterly imputed rate by four to obtain a simple annual rate.
9 
  NOW, MMDA and savings account interest rates offered by banks are collected from the Federal 
Reserve System’s Monthly Survey of Selected Deposits (MSSD), available to us starting with January 
1987.  The MSSD stopped collecting offered interest rate information in September 1994 and was 
discontinued in 1997.
10  The survey respondents were asked to provide the most commonly offered 
interest rate on the largest volume of deposits per deposit type during the last week of each month.
11   The 
MSSD provided offered-rate data at the bank rather than at the bank and market (or branch) level.   
Because the MSSD data sampling frequency is higher than the reporting frequency of the Call Reports, 
we use two alternative measures: the survey rates from the last month of the quarter and the average of 
monthly survey rates for the quarter.  
We also collect market structure variables from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s 
(FDIC) annual Summary of Deposits datasets, and market level personal income data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic Information database. 
An additional survey data set is currently available to researchers, the Bank Rate Monitor (BRM) 
data.  The BRM is a survey provided by a private data vendor that collects bank and market level data on 
a weekly basis. Due, however, to substantial reporting issues which render these deposit prices 
incomparable with Call Report imputed prices, we do not use the BRM data.  The primary issue is that the 
BRM Survey asks participating banks to provide the rates for the banks’ “lowest minimum to open” non-
interest checking account and “lowest minimum to open and earn interest” checking account.  Thus, the 
                                                 
9 Note that the resulting imputed rate is based on interest paid, which is compounded interest.  Since the Call 
Reports do not include any information regarding the frequency of the compounding periods (which varies across 
banks from monthly to semi-annual) we do not make any further adjustments to imputed rates.  As it will be seen 
below, despite this error, our imputed rates slightly underestimate the offered survey rates. 
10 Until end of June 1989, MSSD collected the most commonly offered rate per account type.  Starting with July 
1989, MSSD surveys collected more detailed NOW and MMDA information that accounted for the possibility that 
the bank may offer higher rates for larger maintained-balances.  For consistency in our data series, we filtered 
these data to collect only the most commonly observed offered rate per account type.  Samples available to us end 
in September 1994, because after that date MSSD started to collect interest expense information, instead of interest 
rate information.   
11 Arguably, offered interest rate per number of accounts is a better definition for “most common” than one based on 
the dollar volume of deposits, but MSSD opts for the latter rather than the former.   5
rates stated in the BRM data are effectively the lowest rates offered by banks, not the most-commonly 
cited rates (the mode) as in the MSSD data or the imputed average interest rate paid by the bank (the 
mean) obtained from the Call Report data.  Moreover, BRM does not provide information on the 
percentage of deposits that earn the lowest rates, nor information on rates paid to accounts with greater 
deposit balances.  As a result, we cannot infer the mean or the mode of the rate distribution from BRM 
data.  In summary, as no additional information on the distribution of the BRM deposit rates is available 
that would allow researchers to infer the central tendencies of the surveyed rates, we conclude that the use 
of BRM data in analysis would provide ambiguous results.
12  
 
3. Literature Survey 
Given the methodological focus of this paper, we confine our literature survey to the studies, 
namely the Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) tests, that have examined the relationship between local 
market concentration and deposit interest rates where either the offered or the imputed interest rates have 
been used as dependent variables.  In section 4.3, we test whether using imputed versus offered rates in 
tests of market concentration and deposit rates leads to economically different results.  The SCP paradigm 
implies a relationship between market concentration and firm conduct (in terms of profit or performance); 
such that noncompetitive behavior in more concentrated markets results in a positive (negative) 
relationship between market concentration and profitability (deposit prices).   
While early studies examined the relationship between market concentration (as measured by the 
Hirschman Herfindahl Index) and profitability, Berger and Hannan (1989) was the first to test the price-
market concentration relationship using MSSD offered rates rather than testing the profit-concentration 
relationship.  The authors’ results strongly support the SCP hypothesis when MMDA, NOW and short-
                                                 
12 We examined the BRM surveyed NOW and MMDA rates between January 1998 and December 2000 and 
compared them with the corresponding imputed rates obtained from the Call Reports.  For the said period, BRM 
rates were significantly lower than the corresponding imputed rate.  For NOW accounts mean (median) BRM rate 
was 1.23% (1.01%) compared to mean (median) Call Report imputed rate of 2.56% (1.64%) for the same banks over 
the same period.  For MMDA accounts BRM rate mean was 2.29% (median 2.25%) compared to 3.14% (3.14%) for 
imputed rates.   
   6
term CD rates are used as measure of deposit account prices.  Most of the studies that followed using the 
MSSD data confirm this negative relationship between deposit rates and market concentration (Calem and 
Carlino (1991), Berger and Hannan (1991)), though not without exceptions (for example, Jackson 
(1992)).  Other studies using MSSD data examine how banks change the rates they offer depositors 
(Neumark and Sharpe (1992)), and whether the relationship between market concentration and deposit 
rates holds when concentration changes due to mergers (Prager and Hannan (1998)) or bank branching 
restrictions (Calem and Nakamura (1998)).  A recent study by Brewer and Jackson (2004) considers the 
effects of including bank-specific risk variables (which capture nonperforming loans, capital and the 
interest-rate sensitivity of assets and liabilities) in the SCP analysis. 
Another set of studies use imputed deposit rates obtained from the Call Report data (Heitfield and 
Prager (2002), Rosen (2003), Dick (2002), Hannan and Prager (2004) and Hannan and Prager (2006)) and 
find results generally consistent with studies using the MSSD data.  These more recent studies contribute 
to the literature by testing additional aspects of the SCP paradigm.  Rosen (2003), for example, examines 
whether the size distribution of banks in a market (in addition to market concentration) affects the deposit 
rates.  Heitfield and Prager (1998) test the price-concentration relationship using alternative measures of 
markets (defined at the Metropolitan Statistical Area or MSA and state-level) and find that while local 
market concentration measures are useful, broader concentration measures are also appropriate.  Several 
of the studies comment on the advantage of using the imputed Call Report prices given the extended time 
period for which these data are available (e.g., Rosen (2003), Heitfield and Prager (1998)).
13    
What differs among these studies is the particular interest rate that is found to have the strongest 
relationship (in terms of statistical significance), and the economic implications of the results.  Berger and 
Hannan (1989) find that MMDA rates are 25 to 100 basis points less in the most concentrated markets 
than in the least concentrated markets.  They find similar results for NOW and savings account rates, but 
                                                 
13 To date, only a few studies to date have used the Bank Rate Monitor data, partly due to its inaccessibility to 
researchers and academics until recently.  These studies, however, have not been direct tests of the SCP hypothesis.  
Radecki (1998) and Heitfield (1999) examine the appropriate size of the ‘local-market’; Rosen (2002) presents a 
model of price setting in the presence of heterogeneous customers; and Kiser (2003) studies whether conditions in 
the bank loan market affect the pricing of retail deposits.     7
not for longer-term CD rates.  Calem and Carlino (1991) use MMDA and short-term CD rates (3 and 6 
months) and find similar results, though they do not interpret the economic effects of their findings.  
Berger and Hannan (1991) focus solely on MMDA rates and find an asymmetric relationship between 
rate increases and decreases:  a 29 basis point decrease in the rate of market treasuries leads to 62 percent 
probability that a bank will reduce its MMDA rate.  The same increase in market rates leads to a 39 
percent probability that a bank will increase its MMDA rate.   
Neumark and Sharpe (1992) use MMDA and 6 month CD rates and find that the rates, on 
average, drop 60 basis points between the least to most concentrated markets.  Rosen (2003) includes 
MMDA and NOW accounts also, and finds a small 4 to 7 basis point change in rates with a one standard 
deviation change in the market concentration.  He attributes a larger change in deposit rates to market size 
than market concentration.  Brewer and Jackson (2004) find that the magnitude of the relationship 
between deposit rates and market concentration decreases by 50 percent when bank-specific risk variables 
are included in the SCP analysis.   
In summary, most studies use MMDA or NOW accounts, find strong statistical significance using 
MMDA accounts, less so using NOW accounts and find vastly different economic implications for the 
results.  What is not evident is whether the different economic results found using different rates depend 
on the additional elements included in later studies (i.e., market size, megamergers) or the dataset and 
specific rates used.  We examine this issue in tests of the SCP hypothesis below.   
The only study that examines whether using MSSD offered rates versus Call Report imputed rates 
may lead to different inferences is Prager and Hannan (1999).  In an earlier paper, Prager and Hannan 
(1998), the authors used MSSD offered rates and found that substantial horizontal mergers lead to 
statistically significant decreases in NOW and MMDA rates (24 and 32 basis point decreases, 
respectively).  When revisiting this evidence using Call Report imputed rates (which results in 
significantly larger samples), Prager and Hannan (1999) find that large horizontal mergers have no effect 
on NOW and MMDA accounts, whereas such mergers lead to a small decrease in savings account rates (9   8
basis points).
14  Prager and Hannan (1999) then investigate whether this discrepancy is due to the data 
source upon which each study relies.  They repeat their analysis for a subsample of banks for which both 
offered and imputed rates are available, and find that coefficient estimates differ significantly depending 
on whether monthly MSSD offered rates or quarterly Call Report imputed rates are used.  The authors 
note that the coefficient estimates have the same sign but they do not necessarily have the same statistical 
significance.  Further, the authors find that the coefficients of correlation between offered and imputed 
series range between 0.731 and 0.933 for NOW accounts and 0.515 and 0.689 for MMDA accounts.  The 
authors conclude Call Report imputed prices are “noisy” and “should be used with caution.”   
Our study differs from theirs in a number of dimensions.  First, the Prager and Hannan (1999) 
analysis is limited to a comparison of the coefficient estimates of their model when offered or imputed 
rates are used as dependent variables.  In contrast, we provide formal tests of the bias analyzing the 
direction and the size of the potential bias.  Second, we discuss the reasons why the observed difference 
may exist in the two series.  Third, Prager and Hannan (1999) use all of the monthly survey interest rate 
observations and the quarterly imputed series that are available to them when estimating their empirical 
model.  In contrast, throughout our analysis we include only those banks that have both available offered 
and imputed interest rates.  Our approach allows us to compare the differences in standard errors while 
the estimates are based on the same exact number of observations for the same banks in the same 
quarters. 
  Finally, a number of studies examine the effects that the presence of multimarket (i.e., larger, 
regional or national banks) may have on local market competition, specifically the impact on small single-
market banks (community or rural banks).  Cohen and Mazzeo (forthcoming) assess competition among 
financial institutions in rural markets by differentiating among different types institutions (single-market 
banks, multimarket banks and thrifts).  The authors find that heterogeneous institution types affect 
competition and profitability and conclude that analysis of market concentration should address this 
differentiation.  Berger, Dick, Goldberg, and White (forthcoming) find similar results.  These authors 
                                                 
14 Savings accounts were not analyzed in Prager and Hannan (1998).   9
examine how competition from large, multimarket banks affects the performance of small, single-market 
banks in the same markets and how that competition changed over time.  The authors find that technical 
progress enabled large multimarket banks to compete more effectively against small single-market banks 
in the 1990s.  This finding did not hold with large banks that remained in a single market.  Results of 
these studies provide strong support for conducting robustness checks on a sample of single-market 
banks, rather than examining both multimarket and single market banks together.    
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
We conduct three sets of tests to examine whether imputed deposit rates are representative of the 
deposit rates that banks offer to customers.  First, we examine the distributions for the imputed and 
offered rates for different types of deposit accounts.  Second, we test the null hypothesis that imputed 
interest rates are unbiased estimates of rates that banks offer by regressing offered deposit rates on their 
imputed counterparts in cross-sectional OLS regressions.  In this step, we also examine whether 
winsorizing or truncating helps reduce any statistical bias that may exist.  Finally, to examine whether 
observed statistical differences have any impact on empirical estimations, we estimate separate SCP 
regressions where the dependent variable is first the offered deposit rate and then the imputed deposit 
rate.   
 
4.1 Alternative measures of imputed and offered rates 
The MSSD is a monthly survey.   Thus, we use the offered rates from last survey of the quarter 
(where R_MSSD_END denotes the MSSD rate at the quarter’s end) and an average of the monthly 
surveyed deposit rates during the quarter (R_MSSD_AVE, where AVE denotes quarterly average of the 
MSSD rate).  Included in our MSSD dataset are offered interest rates from 1987 to 1994 for three types of 
accounts: NOW, MMDA and savings accounts. 
The two Call Report imputed rates that we use in our analysis are (1) the ratio of the end-of-
quarter deposit expense (for each account type) divided by the end-of-quarter stock of deposits for the   10
corresponding account type and quarter (R_CR_END) and (2) the ratio of the end-of-quarter deposit 
expense (for each account type) divided by the average stock of deposits over the quarter (R_CR_AVE).   
 
  4.2. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
In Table 1 Panel A we provide detailed distribution information on all of the interest rate series 
that we use in our analysis.  The imputed rates obtained from the Call Report contain extreme outliers.  
Maxima and minima presented in Panel 1A.  MSSD survey rates also contain interest rates that are too 
small or too high, suggesting that the survey data, too, contain outliers.   
One method to minimize the effect of such extreme observations on the empirical analysis is to 
winsorize the variable in question by assigning the tail observations to a specified percentile of the data.  
We assign the observed values below the 1
st and above 99
th (5
th and 95
th) percentiles of the distribution, to 




th) percentiles, respectively.  Alternatively, one could truncate the 
series by dropping observations that are lower or higher than a given threshold at either end of the 
distribution.  Each of these methods, however, has its weaknesses. While both methods preserve the 
central tendency of the distribution for the variable in question, truncation throws out valuable 
observations whereas winsorization assigns arbitrary values to observations that fall outside of the set 
threshold. 
Panel 1A suggests that the large discrepancies observed in the tails of the distributions between 
R_MSSD and R_CR series are attenuated when we move to the 5
th and 95
th percentiles of series’ 
distributions.  The 25
th, 50
th and 75
th quartile observations show relatively smaller differences.  We, 




th percentiles.  The 
tests that we conduct provide guidance whether winsorize or truncate and at what level.  While higher 
levels of winsorization or truncation are certainly possible, we do not consider them here as it would lead 
to the loss of valuable data points and are unlikely to be adopted by researchers. 
In Panel 1B, we test the statistical significance of the observed differences that we observe in 
Panel 1A for selected pairs of survey and imputed rate series that are winsorized at the 1
st–99
th percentiles   11
of their distributions (first three columns of Panel 1B) or truncated at the 5
th–95
th percentiles (last three 
columns).  The t-tests of the equality of the means are rejected in all of the cases at the 1 percent level 
(except for the truncated savings account rates rejected at the 5 percent level).  The equality of the 
variances (the variance ratio test) is also rejected at the one percent level for all six pairs of series that we 
examine.  The rank-order correlations range between 0.51 to 0.89, and are the lowest for savings account 
series and the highest for the NOW account series.  These results suggest that, even though the survey and 
imputed rate series that we examine are highly positively correlated, they may incorporate important 
differences that might lead to imputed rates being biased estimates of survey rates. 
The results of Table 1 provide evidence of statistically significant differences between the offered 
rates obtained from MSSD data and the corresponding imputed rates obtained from the Call Report data 
(for the same set of banks in the same quarters).  
There are a number of reasons why the imputed rates would not be good estimates of the offered 
rates.  The imputed rates, a ratio of the interest expense and the stock of deposits, are affected by error in 
either component.  Such errors include data entry errors, rounding issues, and reporting errors which may 
distort the imputed rate.  Data entry errors are uncommon, but do exist.  Such errors include: entries with 
an incorrect number of zeros, and general typos (reporting the wrong numbers or putting them in the 
wrong item number).   All dollar amounts entered into the Call Reports are rounded to the nearest $1,000.  
Thus, rounding issues are of greater concern for smaller banks which may end up having less accurate 
imputed rates.  A number of reporting errors are likely to affect either the interest expense or the stock of 
deposits reported by banks.   In reporting the interest expense, for example, banks are instructed to deduct 
from gross interest expense any penalties for early withdrawals or portions of such penalties that represent 
the forfeiture of interest accrued or paid to the date of withdrawal.  This accounting requirement would 
reduce the amount of net interest expense reported by any bank that had early withdrawals.   
   12
Next, we investigate to what degree researchers of financial institutions should consider 
winsorization or truncation of imputed rates obtained from bank financial statements.  Following this, we 
examine whether these observed differences generate biases of which researchers should be aware.   
 
4.3. Winsorization versus Truncation of the Offered and Imputed Deposit Rates 
  These outliers, attributed to reporting errors, rounding errors, and mismeasurement, are 
substantial.  Specifically, the MSSD-based MMDA offered rates range between 0.01% and 15.48%, 
whereas the corresponding raw imputed rates range between –60.53% and 216.05%.  Similar outliers are 
observed for all of the offered and imputed deposit rate series in our samples.   
To examine the effects of different levels of winsorization and truncation, we regress the 
winsorized (truncated) offered rate series on winsorized (truncated) imputed rate series with the same 
level of winsorization or truncation:   
t i, t i, t i, R_CR R_MSSD ε β α + + = ,      (1) 
where R_MSSDi,t is the offered rate collected from the MSSD survey, and R_CRi,t is the corresponding 




th percentile thresholds when winsorizing or 
truncating.  In regression (1), if imputed rates are unbiased estimates of the offered rates, the null 
hypothesis requires that α=0 and β=1.
15  
The OLS regression estimates of equation (1) for NOW accounts are presented in Table 2.
16    
The left-hand-side of Table 2 presents results using the quarter-end rate for the survey data 
(R_MSSD_CR) and imputed rates based on the stock of NOW accounts at the end of the quarter 
(R_CR_END).  The null hypothesis (H0: α=0 and β=1) is rejected in Table 2.  The F-test results are 
provided at the bottom of the table.  When using the imputed rates winsorized at the 1
st-99
th percentile of 
their distribution, we obtain estimates of α ˆ =0.0135 and β ˆ =0.6594.  Truncating at the same threshold 
                                                 
15 This null hypothesis is in fact a joint-hypothesis since it presumes that offered transaction rates are the “true” 
interest rates in which researchers are interested.   
16 We repeat the analysis using MMDA and savings account rates, but to conserve space, we do not to report these 
results.   13
level, we obtain estimates of α ˆ =0.0094 and β ˆ =0.7644.  Moving the threshold to the 5
th-95
th percentiles 
and winsorizing the series yields α ˆ =0.0064 and β ˆ =0.8473, whereas truncating at the latter level yields 
α ˆ =0.0040 andβ ˆ =0.9183.  The regression R
2s systematically increase from 0.6333 to 0.8088.  These 
results indicate that truncation at the higher threshold (5
th-95
th percentiles of the imputed rate distribution) 
provides a better fit than the other options tested.  However, the null hypothesis of no bias (H0: α=0 and 
β=1) is rejected for all four regressions. 
In the right-hand side of Table 2, we repeat the above analysis by regressing the average of rates 
surveyed in a given quarter (R_MSSD_AVE) on imputed rates that were calculated based on the average 
stock of deposits during the same quarter (R_CR_AVE).  The results show that the bias is reduced in all 
of the regressions when compared with their counterparts on the left-hand side of Table 2.  The 
coefficient estimates for the series winsorized at the 1
st-99
th percentiles are now α ˆ =0.0073 andβ ˆ =0.8343 
with an R
2 of 0.7895.  The coefficient estimates for the series truncated at the 5
th-95
th percentiles are 
α ˆ =0.0026 andβ ˆ =0.9627 with an R
2 of 0.8857.  Despite a lower α ˆ  and a higherβ ˆ , the null hypothesis 
of no bias is still rejected in all of the regressions.  
We conclude that survey rates and imputed rates truncated at the 5
th and 95
th percentiles of their 
distribution show the least amount of statistical bias.  In the next section, we repeat this analysis and 
check the robustness of our results for rates on other account types. 
 
4.4. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we examine first whether the results observed for NOW accounts in Table 2 also 
hold for MMDA and savings accounts.  We find that they do not.  Columns 1 and 2 of Panel 3A repeat 
columns 4 and 8 of Table 2, respectively, for NOW accounts, while columns 3 and 4 of Panel 3A present   14
the results for MMDA accounts.
17  A sharp increase in the bias appears with regard to the MMDA  rates 
results.  As column 3 shows, regressing R_MSSD_END on R_CR_END for MMDA accounts yields 
α ˆ =0.0280 andβ ˆ =0.4863 with an R
2 of 0.3408 (compared to α ˆ =0.0038 andβ ˆ =0.9244 and an R
2 of 
0.8107 for the comparable NOW account rates in the first column).  Regressing R_MSSD_AVE on 
R_CR_AVE (column 4) yields α ˆ =0.0227 andβ ˆ =0.5832 with an R
2 of 0.4622.  The observed bias is 
higher yet in the case of savings account rates (column 6); where α ˆ =0.0325, β ˆ =0.3689 and R
2=0.2964.  
Not surprisingly, the null hypothesis of no bias is strongly rejected in all of the cases in Panel 3A.  When 
we repeat our bias regressions with the interest rate variables winsorized or truncated at 1
st and 99
th 
percentiles, we find larger bias (we do not report these results to conserve space).  
Given the discrepancy in the bias tests between the NOW accounts versus the MMDA and 
savings accounts, we examine whether the observed differences hold in different subsamples.   
Specifically, we explore whether these discrepancies hold across (i) multimarket versus single-market 
banks (which may potentially explain the observed differences if NOW account rates have less dispersion 
than the MMDA or savings account rates for multimarket banks) and (ii) urban (MSA) versus rural banks.  
The results presented in panels 3B and 3C show that the results observed in Panel 3A for the overall 
sample also hold for the above-mentioned subsamples.  NOW account rates show the least amount of 
bias.  
In Panel 3B, we re-estimate regression (1) for multimarket and single-market banks with the 
series that show the least amount of bias (rates based on averages truncated at the 5
th and 95
th percentiles).  
The results for multimarket banks are very similar to those for single-market banks.  For example, 
multimarket bank NOW account rates (column 1 of Panel 3B) yield estimates of α ˆ =0.0024 
                                                 
17 The number of observations for the NOW account regressions differs slightly between Tables 2 and 3.  We restrict 
the regressions in Table 3 (for all account types) to contain observations for which the end of quarter rates and 
average of the quarter rates are available for each bank.  This allows better comparison of the bias inherent in either 
end or average rates for each account type.   15
andβ ˆ =0.9752, with R
2=0.8755.  The single-market bank NOW account rates (column 4) yield 
α ˆ =0.0027, β ˆ =0.9599 and R
2=0.8982.  Similar results hold for the MSSD and savings account rates.   
We also examine whether the bias differs between urban (MSA) versus rural banks, two 
subsamples that researchers typically examine separately due to the differences in these markets’ 
characteristics.  In results presented in Panel 3C, we observe that the amount of bias (always statistically 
significant) remains about the same for banks operating in these two different types of markets for NOW 
and MMDA accounts.  In the case of savings accounts, the bias for rates reported by urban banks is larger 
than the bias associated with the rates reported by rural banks.   
These results suggest that there are no major discrepancies in the way imputed rates relate to 
survey rates when one compares the multi- versus single-market banks or urban versus rural banks.   
However, the bias is statistically significant for all rates considered in the different subsamples that we 
examined.  What holds across these tests is that the observed bias is the smallest for NOW accounts, 
much larger for MMDAs, and even larger for savings accounts.   
A number of reasons exist as to why the observed bias may differ across account types. The 
larger biases observed for MMDA and savings accounts may be due to the fact that banks are more likely 
to offer rate schedules tiered by deposit amount for MMDA and savings accounts than for NOW 
accounts.  If so, then the offered schedules for MMDA and savings accounts would incorporate more 
dispersion than those for NOW accounts and mode of the distribution collected by the MSSD may be less 
representative of the distribution of rates for MMDA and savings accounts than it is for NOW accounts. 
Another possible source of discrepancy is the minimum amount that is required for the payment 
of interest.  Banks typically impose such minimum thresholds, and these are likely to be higher for 
MMDA and savings accounts than they are for NOW accounts.   If so, MMDA and savings accounts may 
carry proportionally larger number of accounts that carry non-interest earning balances because they fell 
below the interest-earning threshold required by the bank.     16
Despite these data errors and issues, the existence of statistical bias need not result in 
economically different inferences when imputed rates are used instead of offered rates.  We test this 
conjecture next.   
 
4.5. Imputed Deposit Rates versus Offered Deposit Rates in SCP Analysis 
  In this section, we compare the results of deposit price-market concentration regressions to 
determine whether using imputed interest rates instead of the offered interest rates leads to different 
conclusions in studies of the relationship between market concentration and prices (or tests of the SCP 
Hypothesis).  While the scope of this test is limited to a specific case, it is relevant because deposit price 
information has been commonly used in SCP analysis.  We conduct regressions based on equation (2) 
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=
, (2) 
where Ri,t is the deposit-account specific offered or imputed interest rate (R_MSSD or R_CR, 
respectively), HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index of market concentration (calculated for each market 
once a year due to the availability of Summary of Deposits data), MSA is dummy variable that equals 1 
for metropolitan markets and 0 otherwise, and PIPC is the personal income per capita in the market in 
question (in constant beginning-of-sample-period dollars, scaled by $10,000).  Deposit markets are 
defined as the largest of a county, a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or a Consolidated-MSA 
(CMSA).  We interact the HHI variable with the MSA “dummy” to capture the potential differences in 
market concentration that may prevail in rural and urban markets.  This interaction captures the marginal 
effect of an increase in concentration given that market concentration tends to be higher in rural markets 
(DeYoung, Goldberg and White, 1999).  Finally, we account for time variation in deposit rates by 
including time “dummy” variables (Dt) for each quarter except the first. 
We first present the results using the series that exhibited the highest amount of bias in Table 2, 
the offered rates from the last survey of the quarter (R_MSSD_END) and the corresponding imputed rate   17
(R_CR_END), both winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles of their distributions.  The results of the SCP 
regressions using the MSSD data are presented in Panel 4A.  The coefficient estimate for HHI is –0.0033 
(statistically significant at the 1 percent level) when the NOW account offered rate (R_MSSD_END) is 
used as the dependent variable.  This result is consistent with previous studies.  When the NOW account 
imputed rate (R_CR_END) is used, however, the coefficient for HHI (–0.0035) has the expected sign, but 
is not statistically significant.   The HHI interacted with MSA is positive and statistically significant in 
two of the offered rate regressions (the NOW account and savings account rates), but is not significant in 
any of the three imputed rate regressions.   A positive sign on the HHI*MSA coefficient suggests that an 
increase in market concentration in urban (MSA) markets results in marginally lower deposit rates than in 
a non-MSA market.   
While the coefficient estimates are similar, the standard errors are larger when Call Report 
imputed rates are used as the dependent variable.  Indeed, all of the standard errors in column 2 (where 
R_CR_END is the dependent variable) are larger than their counterparts in column 1 (where 
R_MSSD_END is the dependent variable).  This is not surprising, as the Call Report rates (the R_CR) 
presumably incorporate larger measurement error; and hence larger standard errors.  Importantly, the 
measurement error in the dependent variable does not lead to a bias or inconsistent estimates but to less 
efficient estimates.   
The results for the MMDA accounts (columns 3 and 4) and savings accounts (columns 5 and 6) 
are similar; we find variation in the coefficient estimates between offered (R_MSSD) and imputed 
(R_CR) rates, with the standard errors being larger in the case of the latter.  The coefficient on HHI is not 
statistically significant for regressions using MMDA rates.   
Results of SCP regressions for the series that exhibit the least amount of bias are presented in 
Panel B of Table 4.  This panel contains the average of rates surveyed over the quarter (R_MSSD_AVE) 
versus imputed rates based on average deposits during the quarter (R_CR_AVE) and truncated at the 5
th 
and 95
th percentiles of their distributions.  In general, the results using the two data sets are more similar 
in this panel than in Panel A.  The coefficient estimates and standard errors are comparable between the   18
offered and imputed rates, and, consequentially, the signs and statistical significance of the coefficients 
would, in all cases but one, lead to like policy conclusions.  A quick comparison of the two panels of 
Table 4 yields the following observations: First, in Panel 4B the discrepancy across coefficient estimates 
in columns 1 and 2 is much smaller, as are the standard deviations for the coefficient estimates.  For 
example, in column 1 the coefficient estimate for HHI is equal to –0.0019 (with a standard error of 
0.0013), in column 2 the corresponding coefficient estimate is –0.0012 (with a standard error of 0.0014).  
Again, neither of these coefficients is statistically significant.  As in Panel A, the observed discrepancies 
for the same coefficient estimates are larger in the other columns as MMDA and savings account rate 
series exhibit larger biases.  Even in those cases, however, the coefficient estimates in the SCP 
regressions for offered and imputed rates are similar and exhibit the same signs and significance levels; 
the coefficient on HHI is not significant in any of the regressions, but the coefficient on HHI*MSA is 
statistically significant in the regressions using the NOW imputed or offered rates.  We find one notable 
difference in this set of regressions: HHI*MSA is significant in the regression using the savings account 
offered rate, but not the savings account imputed rate.  
Based on these results, we recommend that researchers use the imputed series based on the 
average stock of deposits during the quarter and truncate the obtained variable at the 5
th and 95
th 
percentiles of its distribution.   This choice would lead to coefficient estimates that are qualitatively 
similar to those that obtained from survey data, with the caveat that the former would have larger standard 
errors due to measurement error.
18   
As Prager and Hannan (1999) note, imputed interest rates are noisy estimates of offered 
(transaction) deposit rates.  However, our work shows the importance of truncation and suggests that the 
                                                 
18 While these findings and conclusions seemingly contradict Prager and Hannan (1999), a number of discrepancies 
between the Prager and Hannan (1999) study and our study exist.  First, Prager and Hannan (1999) estimate a model 
of price changes that compares pre- and post-merger prices whereas we estimate a SCP model in the price levels.  
Second, Prager and Hannan (1999) estimate the same model using monthly MSSD offered rates and quarterly Call 
Report imputed rates for the same time horizons.  Thus the offered rate regressions would have a higher number of 
observations, and hence lower standard errors, than the regressions in which quarterly Call Report imputed rates are 
used.  Conversely, our comparisons of offered versus imputed rates use the same number of observations in each of 
these regressions. 
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coefficient estimates obtained using the imputed rates (properly constructed and truncated) leads to 
analogous policy conclusions.   
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we provide a systematic analysis of the bias that imputed interest rates may 
introduce when used as estimates of offered interest rates.  Our results provide strong evidence of 
statistical bias.  Imputed interest rates tend to underestimate the true interest rates offered to customers for 
the same account type at the same bank.  We further examine whether this observed bias leads to 
economically different results in analyses that researchers conduct.  Reassuringly, we find that this is not 
the case; typically the coefficient estimates have the same signs, same levels of statistical significance, 
and are of the same order of magnitude irrespective of whether imputed or offered rates are used.  This 
suggests that imputed rates are suitable estimates of offered (transaction) rates when conducting empirical 
research.  An important implication of our research is that empirical analyses of bank price data need not 
remain limited to survey data as imputed rates from the Call Reports are available for the population of 
U.S. banks.   20
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Table 1. Summary Statistics and Univariate Tests  
 
Panel A presents distributional information on Monthly Survey of Selected Deposits (MSSD) survey rates and Call Report (CR) imputed rates.  END 
refers to MSSD series based on the last survey of quarter and CR series based on the stock of deposits at the end of the same quarter.  AVE refers to 
MSSD series based on the average of surveyed rates during the quarter and CR series based on the average stock of deposits during the quarter.  Panel 
B presents tests of equality of the means (t-test with H0: meanX – meanY = 0), tests of equality of the variances (F-test with H0: varX ÷ varY = 1). And 
rank-order correlations (ρ) for selected pairs of series from Panel A. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
























R_MSSD_END  14,445 0.0001 0.0120 0.0151 0.0275  0.0470 0.0505 0.0550 0.0608  0.1548 
R_CR_END  14,445  –0.8296 0.0098 0.0155 0.0275  0.0439 0.0502 0.0617 0.1027  1.3333 
              





R_CR_AVE  14,445  –1.9801 0.0097 0.0155 0.0273  0.0443 0.0499 0.0570 0.0782  1.0000 
                 
R_MSSD_END  8,339 0.0350 0.0450 0.0495 0.0525  0.0550 0.0600 0.0710 0.0800  0.1150 
R_CR_END  8,339  –0.0771 0.0245 0.0466 0.0534  0.0576 0.0635 0.0747 0.0975  1.3333 
              
R_MSSD_AVE  8,339 0.0350 0.0460 0.0494 0.0525  0.0553 0.0600 0.0708 0.0794  0.1050 
MMDA  1987Q1-
1991Q2 
R_CR_AVE  8,339  –0.0967 0.0262 0.0479 0.0533  0.0570 0.0629 0.0741 0.0925  1.7770 
                 
R_MSSD_END  8,442 0.0400 0.0425 0.0450 0.0500  0.0510 0.0550    0.0575 0.0737  0.0895 
R_CR_END  8,442  –0.8703 0.0223 0.0415 0.0485  0.0512 0.0547 0.0691 0.1157  0.4727 
              





R_CR_AVE  8,442  –0.8387 0.0224 0.0431 0.0492  0.0514 0.0549 0.0690 0.1186  1.1104 
 
Panel 1B    





Rates Truncated at 5
th & 95
th  Percentiles 
 
   R_MSSD_END  R_CR_END  tests    R_MSSD_AVE  R_CR_AVE  tests   
Mean  0.0404 0.0408  –2.44  **  0.0408 0.0396  7.94  ** 
Standard Deviation  0.0134 0.0161  0.69  **  0.0118 0.0115  1.05  ** 
NOW 
Accounts 
Rank-order correlation (ρ)     0.82  **     0.89  ** 
Mean  0.0571 0.0588  –13.02  **  0.0562 0.0574  –13.64  ** 
Standard Deviation  0.0068 0.0099  0.47  **  0.0046 0.0053  0.74  ** 
MMDA 
Rank-order correlation (ρ)     0.59  **     0.69  ** 
Mean  0.0520 0.0527  –5.63  **  0.0515 0.0514  –1.80  * 
Standard Deviation  0.0044 0.0113  0.15  **  0.0027 0.0040  0.46  ** 
Savings 
Accounts 
Rank-order correlation (ρ)     0.51  **     0.64  **   23
Table 2. Winsorize or Truncate the Deposit Rates? 
 
This table presents the results of the following OLS regression for unbalanced panels of U.S. commercial banks: 
t i, t i, t i, R_CR R_MSSD ε β α + + =          ( 1 )  
The dependent variable is the interest rate that the bank has most commonly offered for NOW accounts and reported in the last survey of the quarter.  
The explanatory variable is the imputed interest rate for NOW accounts obtained from the Call Reports for the same bank in the same quarter.  All 
equations are estimated using OLS with Huber-White standard errors (reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates) for clustering across 
banks.  F-statistics are reported for the joint-null hypothesis that α=0 and β=1.  * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 
NOW Account Rates 
 
             
t i, t i, t i, R_CR_END R_MSSD_END ε β α + + =    
t i, t i, t i, R_CR_AVE R_MSSD_AVE ε β α + + =    
 
 




































































































































































































   
Constant      0.0135  **  0.0094  **  0.0064  **  0.0040  **  0.0073  **  0.0044  **  0.0044  **  0.0026  ** 
              (0.0009)    (0.0008)    (0.0005)    (0.0003)    (0.0005)    (0.0003)    (0.0004)    (0.0003)   
                         
R_CR  0.6594  **              0.8343  **             
winsorized at 1%  (0.0244)                (0.0132)               
                         
R_CR      0.7644  **              0.9083  **         
truncated at 1%      (0.0212)                (0.0087)           
                         
R_CR          0.8473  **              0.9158  **     
winsorized at 5%          (0.0112)                (0.0084)       
                         
R_CR              0.9183  **              0.9627  ** 
truncated at 5%              (0.0076)                (0.0057)   
                         
H0: α = 0  &  β = 1  118.9  **  95.1  **  99.8  **  72.9  **  105.7  **  105.0  **  88.9  **  95.3  ** 
                         
Bank-quarter obs.  14,446    13,912    14,446    12,564    14,973    14,393    14,973    12,751   
Number of banks  735    730    735    720    737    735    737    721   
R
2  0.6333    0.7175    0.7760    0.8088    0.7895    0.8542    0.8528    0.8857   
Regression F-stat          731.4  **  1296.5  **  5680.7  **  14702.3  **  4007.8  **  10981.0  **  12015.4  **  28312.8  **   24
Table 3. Tests of Statistical Bias 
 
This table presents the results of the following OLS regression for unbalanced panels of U.S. commercial banks: 
t i, t i, t i, R_CR R_MSSD ε β α + + =          ( 1 )  
The dependent variable is the interest rate that the bank has most commonly offered for a particular type of deposit account. We use either the rate 
from the last survey of the quarter or the average of rates in all surveys of the quarter.  The explanatory variable is the imputed interest rate obtained 
from the Call Reports.  We use either the stock of deposits as reported at the end of the quarter or the average stock of deposits through the quarter (as 
reported in Schedule K of Call Reports).  All imputed rates are truncated at 5% of either side of their distributions. All equations are estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with Huber-White standard errors for clustering across banks.  F-statistics are reported for the joint-null hypothesis that 
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Constant      0.0038  **  0.0026  **  0.0280  **  0.0227  **  0.0336  **  0.0325  ** 
              (0.0003)    (0.0003)    (0.0009)    (0.0011)    (0.0011)    (0.0015)   
                   
R_CR_END  0.9244  **      0.4863  **      0.3490  **     
  (0.0077)        (0.0169)        (0.0205)       
                   
R_CR_AVE      0.9641  **      0.5832  **      0.3689  ** 
      (0.0058)        (0.0196)        (0.0280)   
                   
H0: α=0 & β=1  68.3  **  97.1  **  462.2  **  230.4  **  511.2  **  255.0  ** 
                         
# of bank-quarter obs.  11,967    11,967    6,646    6,646    6,914    6,914   
# of banks  714    714    619    619    614    614   
R
2  0.8107    0.8858    0.3408    0.4622    0.2655    0.2964   
Regression F-stat            14509.2  **  27475.3  **  828.0  **  884.5  **  289.8  **  173.2  ** 
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Multimarket Banks vs. Single-Market Banks 
t i, t i, t i, R_CR_AVE R_MSSD_AVE ε β α + + =  
(all rates are truncated at the 5
th & 95









   
MMDA 
  Savings  
Accounts 
   
NOW 
   
MMDA 
  Savings  
Accounts 
 
Constant      0.0024  **  0.0271  **  0.0363  **  0.0027  **  0.0282  **  0.0392  ** 
              (0.0004)    (0.0022)    (0.0018)    (0.0004)    (0.0023)    (0.0028)   
                    
R_CR_AVE  0.9756  **  0.5049  **  0.2901  **  0.9599  **  0.4901  **  0.2470  ** 
  (0.0087)    (0.0379)    (0.0346)    (0.0086)    (0.0408)    (0.0534)   
                     
H0: α=0 & β=1  55.4  **  112.9  **  210.0  **  41.1  **  87.5  **  100.9  ** 
                           
# of bank-quarter obs.  6,265    3,537    3,574    4,563    2,746    2,861   
# of banks  394    322    318    348    290    284   
R
2  0.8755    0.3940    0.2255    0.8982    0.4010    0.1848   




Urban (MSA) vs. Rural Market Banks 
t i, t i, t i, R_CR_AVE R_MSSD_AVE ε β α + + =  
(all rates are truncated at the 5
th & 95
th percentile of their distributions) 
 
  
Urban (MSA) Market Banks 
  




   
MMDA 
  Savings  
Accounts 
   
NOW 
   
MMDA 
  Savings  
Accounts 
 
Constant      0.0024  **  0.0275  **  0.0383  **  0.0030  **  0.0287  **  0.0303  ** 
              (0.0003)    (0.0018)    (0.0018)    (0.0007)    (0.0038)    (0.0029)   
                         
R_CR_AVE  0.9712  **  0.5002  **  0.2565  **  0.9509  **  0.4737  **  0.4159  ** 
  (0.0068)    (0.0307)    (0.0344)    (0.0156)    (0.0678)    (0.0572)   
                         
H0: α=0 & β=1  83.4  **  163.3  **  236.8  **  13.4  **  33.8  **  53.5  ** 
                               
# of bank-quarter obs.  9,140    5,325    5,441    1,688    958    994   
# of banks  558    479    474    106    90    88   
R
2  0.8880    0.3926    0.1929    0.8657    0.4113    0.3241   
Regression F-stat            20449.2  **  264.6  **  55.7  **  3736.0  **  48.8  **  52.9  **   26
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     ( 2 )  
The dependent variable is either (i) the MSSD offered interest rate (R_MSSD) or (ii) the Call Report imputed rate (R_CR).  HHI is the Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index of market concentration.  MSA is a “dummy” variable for metropolitan markets. PIPC is the personal income per capita (in constant-
beginning-of-sample-year dollars).  OLS regressions control for clustering at the bank level using Huber-White standard errors.  T-statistics appear in 






MSSD Offered Rates versus CR Imputed Rates in SCP Regressions 
 
(all rates winsorized at 1
st & 99
th percentile of their distributions) 
 
 




































































Constant      0.0250  **  0.0225  **  0.0508  **  0.0553  **  0.0482  **  0.0458  ** 
              (0.0016)    (0.0025)    (0.0014)    (0.0016)    (0.0014)    (0.0031)   
                    
HHI           –0.0033  *  –0.0035    –0.0018    –0.0015    –0.0003    0.0041   
              (0.0015)    (0.0027)    (0.0024)    (0.0026)    (0.0015)    (0.0048)   
                   
MSA           –0.0020  *  –0.0035  *  –0.0014    –0.0007    –0.0002    0.0002   
  (0.0009)    (0.0016)    (0.0013)    (0.0015)    (0.0008)    (0.0019)   
                   
HHI×MSA  –0.0067  *  –0.0042    –0.0020    –0.0034    –0.0065  **  –0.0087   
              (0.0028)    (0.0045)    (0.0038)    (0.0047)    (0.0025)    (0.0061)   
                   
PIPC (in $10,000)  –0.0008    0.0002    0.0030  **  0.0017    0.0015  **  0.0013   
              (0.0005)    (0.0008)    (0.0007)    (0.0009)    (0.0005)    (0.0009)   
                   
Quarter dummies  yes    yes    yes    yes    yes    yes   
# of bank-quarter obs.  10,956    10,956    6,348    6,348    6,343    6,343   
# of banks  589    589    511    511    511    511   
R
2  0.8609    0.6213    0.2553    0.1742    0.0641    0.0268   
Regression F-stat            406.2  **  268.0  **  50.2  **  61.8  **  10.8  **  18.3  **   27
Table 4. Imputed Vs. Offered Rates in Structure Conduct Performance Analysis (continued) 
 
The dependent variable is either (i) the MSSD offered interest rate (R_MSSD) or (ii) the Call Report imputed rate (R_CR).  HHI is the Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index of market concentration.  MSA is a “dummy” variable for metropolitan markets. PIPC is the personal income per capita (in constant-
beginning-of-sample-year dollars).  OLS regressions control for clustering at the bank level using Huber-White standard errors.  T-statistics appear in 






MSSD Offered Rates versus CR Imputed Rates in SCP Regressions 
 
(all rates truncated at 5
th & 95
th percentile of their distributions) 
 
 




































































Constant      0.0255  **  0.0250  **  0.0476  **  0.0486  **  0.0496  **  0.0500  ** 
              (0.0013)    (0.0015)    (0.0013)    (0.0014)    (0.0010)    (0.0012)   
                   
HHI           –0.0019    –0.0012    0.0005    0.0008    –0.0004    –0.0009   
              (0.0013)    (0.0014)    (0.0021)    (0.0020)    (0.0015)    (0.0015)   
                   
MSA           –0.0017  *  –0.0018    –0.0001    0.0002    –0.0002    –0.0011   
  (0.0008)    (0.0009)    (0.0009)    (0.0009)    (0.0007)    (0.0008)   
                   
HHI×MSA  –0.0057  *  –0.0066  **  –0.0029    –0.0031    –0.0053  *  –0.0042   
              (0.0024)    (0.0025)    (0.0030)    (0.0031)    (0.0021)    (0.0026)   
                   
PIPC (in $10,000)  –0.0003    –0.0001    0.0021  **  0.0017  **  0.0006    0.0007   
              (0.0005)    (0.0005)    (0.0005)    (0.0005)    (0.0004)    (0.0005)   
                   
Quarter “dummies”  yes    yes    yes    yes    yes    yes   
# of bank-quarter obs.  9,763    9,763    5,746    5,746    5,887    5,887   
# of banks  579    579    514    514    503    503   
R
2  0.8800    0.8215    0.2671    0.2607    0.0626    0.0354   
Regression F-stat            414.9  **  372.3  **  39.9  **  53.7  **  7.7  **  6.9  ** 
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